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LaFollette H. The Oxford handbook of practical ethics. Oxford: : Oxford University Press https://go.exlibris.link/RV7rDtbY
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LaFollette H. Ethics in practice: an anthology. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: : Wiley Blackwell 2014. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=7104082&query=Ethics+in+Practice+%3A+An+Anthology
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Benatar D. Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. Oxford: : Clarendon Press 2013. http://encore.lib.warwick.ac.uk/iii/encore/record/C__Rb2664047
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David Benatar. Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics. The Journal of Ethics 2013;17:121–51.http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/42630950
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Elizabeth Harman. Reviewed Work: Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence by David Benatar. Noûs 2009;43:776–85.http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/40660445
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Benatar D. To Be or Not to Have Been? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 2001;15:255–66.https://contentstore.cla.co.uk/secure/link?id=02f32382-9cf4-e811-80cd-005056af4099
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Bradley B. Benatar and the Logic of Betterness. Journal of ethics & social philosophy 2010;4.http://mail.jesp.org/articles/download/BenataronBetternessNote.pdf
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Len Doyal. Is Human Existence Worth Its Consequent Harm? Journal of Medical Ethics 2007;33:573–6.http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/27719952
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LaFollette H. Ethics in practice: an anthology. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: : Wiley Blackwell 2014. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=7104082&query=Ethics+in+Practice+%3A+An+Anthology
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LaFollette H. Ethics in practice: an anthology. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: : Wiley Blackwell 2014. http://encore.lib.warwick.ac.uk/iii/encore/record/C__Rb3090093
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Shelly Kagan. The Additive Fallacy. Ethics 1988;99:5–31.http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2380927
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Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, et al. Amos Elon Murray Kempton Amy Knight Roderick MacFarquhar Lisa Appignanesi Ian Johnson Zia Haider Rahman Tom Vanderbilt Mark Greenberg. Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief. The New York Review of Books Published Online First: 1997.http://0-www.nybooks.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/articles/1997/03/27/assisted-suicide-the-philosophers-brief/
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HARE RM. POSSIBLE PEOPLE. Bioethics 1988;2:279–93. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1988.tb00055.x
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Michael Huemer. In Defence of Repugnance. Mind 2008;117:899–933.http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/20532700
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