Bibliography for PH212:Applied Ethics (Term 2) BETA

Anon. 2015. ‘Markets without Symbolic Limits’. Ethics 125:1053–77.

Benatar, D. 2001. ‘To Be or Not to Have Been?’ International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15(2):255–66.

Benatar, David. 2013. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bennett, Jonathan. 1995. The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon.

Bradley, B. 2010. ‘Benatar and the Logic of Betterness’. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 4(2).

Brian McElwee. 2011. ‘Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14(4):457–66.

Broome, John. 2005. ‘Should We Value Population?*’. Journal of Political Philosophy 13(4):399–413. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2005.00230.x.

Campbell, Joseph Keim, Michael O’Rourke, Harry Silverstein, and Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference. 2010. Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Caney, Simon. 2010. ‘Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Emissions Trading?’ New Political Economy 15(2):197–224. doi: 10.1080/13563460903586202.

David Benatar. 2013. ‘Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics’. The Journal of Ethics 17(1):121–51.

Elizabeth Harman. 2009. ‘Reviewed Work: Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence by David Benatar’. Noûs 43(4):776–85.

Feldman, Fred. 1991. ‘Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death’. The Philosophical Review 100(2). doi: 10.2307/2185300.

Freiman, Christopher. 2014. ‘Vote Markets’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(4):759–74. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.892147.

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Heath Wellman. 2005a. A Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Heath Wellman. 2005b. A Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Heath Wellman. 2005c. A Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Heath Wellman. 2005d. A Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Heath Wellman. 2005e. A Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Heath Wellman. 2005f. A Companion to Applied Ethics. [Paperback ed.]. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Glover, Jonathan. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Greaves, Hilary. 2017. ‘Population Axiology’. Philosophy Compass 12(11). doi: 10.1111/phc3.12442.

Guerrero, Alexander A. 2007. ‘Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution’. Philosophical Studies 136(1):59–97. doi: 10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7.

HARE, R. M. 1988. ‘POSSIBLE PEOPLE’. Bioethics 2(4):279–93. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.1988.tb00055.x.

Harris, John, ed. 2001a. Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harris, John, ed. 2001b. Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Johansson, Jens. 2013. ‘Past and Future Non-Existence’. The Journal of Ethics 17(1–2):51–64. doi: 10.1007/s10892-012-9137-3.

Kagan, Shelly. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kagan, Shelly. 2012. Death. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kagan, Shelly. 2016. ‘What’s Wrong with Speciesism? (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2015)’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33(1):1–21. doi: 10.1111/japp.12164.

Kamm, F. M. 1999. ‘Physician‐Assisted Suicide, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and the Ground of Value’. Ethics 109(3):586–605. doi: 10.1086/233923.

Kamm, Frances. 1997. ‘A Right to Choose Death’. Boston Review 22.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014a. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014b. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014c. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014d. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014e. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014f. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. 2014g. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Vol. 38. Fourth edition. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell.

LaFollette, Hugh. n.d.-a. The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LaFollette, Hugh. n.d.-b. The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lantz, Goran. 2000. ‘Applied Ethics: What Kind of Ethics and What Kind of Ethicist?’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 17(1):21–28. doi: 10.1111/1468-5930.00137.

Len Doyal. 2007. ‘Is Human Existence Worth Its Consequent Harm?’ Journal of Medical Ethics 33(10):573–76.

Lomasky, Loren. n.d. ‘IS IT WRONG TO EAT ANIMALS?’ Social Philosophy & Policy 30(1–2):177–200.

Michael Fox. 1978. ‘“Animal Liberation”: A Critique’. Ethics 88(2):106–18.

Michael Huemer. 2008. ‘In Defence of Repugnance’. Mind 117(468):899–933.

Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Mortal Questions. [Cambridge]: Cambridge University Press.

Panitch, Vida. 2013. ‘Surrogate Tourism and Reproductive Rights’. Hypatia 28(2):274–89. doi: 10.1111/hypa.12005.

Parfit, Derek. 1986a. ‘Chapter X - Overpopulation and the Quality of Life’. Pp. 145–64 in Applied ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, Derek. 1986b. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, Derek. 2016. ‘Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?’ Theoria 82(2):110–27. doi: 10.1111/theo.12097.

Peter Singer. 1980. ‘Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 9(4):325–37.

Pummer, Theron. 2016. ‘Whether and Where to Give’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 44(1):77–95. doi: 10.1111/papa.12065.

Review by:                          Jefferson McMahan. 1981. ‘Review: Problems of Population Theory’. Ethics 92(1):96–127.

Rippon, Simon. 2014. ‘Imposing Options on People in Poverty: The Harm of a Live Donor Organ Market’. Journal of Medical Ethics 40(3):145–50. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2011-100318.

Roberts, Melinda A. 2003. ‘Can It Ever Be Better Never to Have Existed At All? Person-Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20(2):159–85. doi: 10.1111/1468-5930.00244.

Roberts, Melinda A. 2011. ‘An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation’. Philosophy Compass 6(11):765–76. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00435.x.

Roberts, Melinda A., and David T. Wasserman. 2009. Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Vol. v. 35. Dordrecht: Springer.

Ronald Dworkin,    Thomas Nagel,    Robert Nozick,    John Rawls,      and Judith Jarvis Thomson, et al.                      Amos Elon                    Murray Kempton                    Amy Knight                    Roderick MacFarquhar              Lisa Appignanesi            Ian Johnson            Zia Haider Rahman            Tom Vanderbilt            Mark Greenberg. 1997. ‘Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief’. The New York Review of Books (March 27, 1997).

Sandel, Michael J. 2012. What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. London: Allen Lane.

Satz, Debra. 2010. Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shand, John. 1997. ‘A Reply to Some Standard Objections to Euthanasia’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14(1):43–47. doi: 10.1111/1468-5930.00038.

Shelly Kagan. 1988. ‘The Additive Fallacy’. Ethics 99(1):5–31.

Singer, Peter. 1986a. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, Peter. 1986b. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, Peter. 1986c. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smilansky, Saul. 2013. ‘Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(4):655–66. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775168.

SMUTS, AARON. 2012. ‘LESS GOOD BUT NOT BAD: IN DEFENSE OF EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93(2):197–227. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01423.x.

Smuts, Aaron. 2014. ‘To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17(4):711–29. doi: 10.1007/s10677-013-9461-0.

Steinbock, Bonnie, and Alastair Norcross. 1994. Killing and Letting Die. 2nd ed. New York: Fordham University Press.

Tannsjo, Torbjorn. 2002. ‘Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion’. Utilitas 14(03):339–59. doi: 10.1017/S0953820800003642.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1999. ‘Physician‐Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments’. Ethics 109(3):497–518. doi: 10.1086/233919.

Tooley, Michael. 1994. ‘An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing versus Letting Die’. Pp. 103–11 in Killing and letting die. New York: Fordham University Press.

Unger, Peter. 1996. Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. New York: Oxford University Press.

Velleman, J. David. 1999. ‘A Right of Self‐Termination?’ Ethics 109(3):606–28. doi: 10.1086/233924.

Wolf, Susan. 1982. ‘Moral Saints’. The Journal of Philosophy 79(8). doi: 10.2307/2026228.

Woollard, Fiona. 2012a. ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction’. Philosophy Compass 7(7):448–58. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00491.x.

Woollard, Fiona. 2012b. ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction’. Philosophy Compass 7(7):459–69. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00492.x.