Bibliography for PH212:Applied Ethics (Term 2) BETA

1.

Frey, R.G., Wellman, C.H.: A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).

2.

Singer, P.: Applied ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986).

3.

LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK (2014).

4.

LaFollette, H.: The Oxford handbook of practical ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

5.

Lantz, G.: Applied Ethics: What Kind of Ethics and What Kind of Ethicist? Journal of Applied Philosophy. 17, 21–28 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00137.

6.

Frey, R.G., Wellman, C.H.: A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).

7.

LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK (2014).

8.

Benatar, D.: Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. Clarendon Press, Oxford (2013).

9.

David Benatar: Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics. The Journal of Ethics. 17, 121–151 (2013).

10.

Elizabeth Harman: Reviewed Work: Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence by David Benatar. Noûs. 43, 776–785 (2009).

11.

Benatar, D.: To Be or Not to Have Been? International Journal of Applied Philosophy. 15, 255–266 (2001).

12.

Bradley, B.: Benatar and the Logic of Betterness. Journal of ethics & social philosophy. 4, (2010).

13.

Len Doyal: Is Human Existence Worth Its Consequent Harm? Journal of Medical Ethics. 33, 573–576 (2007).

14.

Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T.: Harming future persons: ethics, genetics and the nonidentity problem. Springer, Dordrecht (2009).

15.

Roberts, M.A.: Can it Ever Be Better Never to Have Existed At All? Person-Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 20, 159–185 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00244.

16.

Roberts, M.A.: An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation. Philosophy Compass. 6, 765–776 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00435.x.

17.

Smilansky, S.: Morally, should we prefer never to have existed? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 91, 655–666 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.775168.

18.

Smuts, A.: To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 17, 711–729 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9461-0.

19.

Satz, D.: Why some things should not be for sale: the moral limits of markets. Oxford University Press, New York (2010).

20.

Rippon, S.: Imposing options on people in poverty: the harm of a live donor organ market. Journal of Medical Ethics. 40, 145–150 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2011-100318.

21.

Markets without Symbolic Limits. Ethics. 125, 1053–1077 (2015).

22.

Sandel, M.J.: What money can’t buy: the moral limits of markets. Allen Lane, London (2012).

23.

Caney, S.: Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, if Anything, is Wrong with Emissions Trading? New Political Economy. 15, 197–224 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460903586202.

24.

Freiman, C.: Vote Markets. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 92, 759–774 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.892147.

25.

Panitch, V.: Surrogate Tourism and Reproductive Rights. Hypatia. 28, 274–289 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12005.

26.

LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK (2014).

27.

LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK (2014).

28.

Pummer, T.: Whether and Where to Give. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 44, 77–95 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12065.

29.

Frey, R.G., Wellman, C.H.: A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).

30.

Brian McElwee: Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 14, 457–466 (2011).

31.

Unger, P.: Living high and letting die: our illusion of innocence. Oxford University Press, New York (1996).

32.

Wolf, S.: Moral Saints. The Journal of Philosophy. 79, (1982). https://doi.org/10.2307/2026228.

33.

LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK (2014).

34.

LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, UK (2014).

35.

Kagan, S.: What’s Wrong with Speciesism? (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2015). Journal of Applied Philosophy. 33, 1–21 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12164.

36.

Michael Fox: ‘Animal Liberation’: A Critique. Ethics. 88, 106–118 (1978).

37.

LaFollette, H.: The Oxford handbook of practical ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

38.

Lomasky, Loren: IS IT WRONG TO EAT ANIMALS? Social Philosophy & Policy. 30, 177–200.

39.

Frey, R.G., Wellman, C.H.: A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).

40.

Peter Singer: Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 9, 325–337 (1980).

41.

Guerrero, A.A.: Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution. Philosophical Studies. 136, 59–97 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7.

42.

Campbell, J.K., O’Rourke, M., Silverstein, H., Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference: Action, ethics, and responsibility. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass (2010).

43.

Tooley, M.: An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing versus Letting Die. In: Killing and letting die. pp. 103–111. Fordham University Press, New York (1994).

44.

Shelly Kagan: The Additive Fallacy. Ethics. 99, 5–31 (1988).

45.

Woollard, F.: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass. 7, 448–458 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00491.x.

46.

Woollard, F.: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction. Philosophy Compass. 7, 459–469 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00492.x.

47.

Bennett, J.: The act itself. Clarendon, Oxford (1995).

48.

Steinbock, B., Norcross, A.: Killing and letting die. Fordham University Press, New York (1994).

49.

Kagan, S.: The limits of morality. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1989).

50.

Harris, J. ed: Bioethics. Oxford University Press, New York (2001).

51.

Frey, R.G., Wellman, C.H.: A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).

52.

Nagel, T.: Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press, [Cambridge] (1979).

53.

Kagan, S.: Death. Yale University Press, New Haven (2012).

54.

Feldman, F.: Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death. The Philosophical Review. 100, (1991). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185300.

55.

Johansson, J.: Past and Future Non-Existence. The Journal of Ethics. 17, 51–64 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9137-3.

56.

SMUTS, A.: LESS GOOD BUT NOT BAD: IN DEFENSE OF EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 93, 197–227 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01423.x.

57.

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58.

Ronald Dworkin,    Thomas Nagel,    Robert Nozick,    John Rawls,      and Judith Jarvis Thomson, et al.                      Amos Elon                    Murray Kempton                    Amy Knight                    Roderick MacFarquhar              Lisa Appignanesi            Ian Johnson            Zia Haider Rahman            Tom Vanderbilt            Mark Greenberg: Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief. The New York Review of Books. (1997).

59.

Kamm, F.: A Right to Choose Death. Boston Review. 22, (1997).

60.

Velleman, J.D.: A Right of Self‐Termination? Ethics. 109, 606–628 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1086/233924.

61.

Glover, J.: Causing death and saving lives. Penguin, Harmondsworth (1977).

62.

Singer, P.: Applied ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986).

63.

Kamm, F.M.: Physician‐Assisted Suicide, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and the Ground of Value. Ethics. 109, 586–605 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1086/233923.

64.

Shand, J.: A Reply to Some Standard Objections to Euthanasia. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 14, 43–47 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00038.

65.

Thomson, J.J.: Physician‐Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments. Ethics. 109, 497–518 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1086/233919.

66.

Frey, R.G., Wellman, C.H.: A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Malden, MA (2005).

67.

Singer, P.: Applied ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986).

68.

Parfit, D.: Chapter X - Overpopulation and the Quality of Life. In: Applied ethics. pp. 145–164. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986).

69.

Parfit, D.: Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986).

70.

Parfit, D.: Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion? Theoria. 82, 110–127 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12097.

71.

Broome, J.: Should We Value Population?*. Journal of Political Philosophy. 13, 399–413 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2005.00230.x.

72.

Harris, J. ed: Bioethics. Oxford University Press, New York (2001).

73.

Greaves, H.: Population axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12, (2017). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12442.

74.

HARE, R.M.: POSSIBLE PEOPLE. Bioethics. 2, 279–293 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.1988.tb00055.x.

75.

Michael Huemer: In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117, 899–933 (2008).

76.

Review by:                          Jefferson McMahan: Review: Problems of Population Theory. Ethics. 92, 96–127 (1981).

77.

Tannsjo, T.: Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas. 14, 339–359 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800003642.