1.
Lantz, G.: Applied Ethics: What Kind of Ethics and What Kind of Ethicist? Journal of applied philosophy. 17, 21–28 (2000).
2.
Norman, R.: Applied Ethics: What is Applied to What? Utilitas. 12, 119–136 (2000).
3.
LaFollette, H. ed: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex (2014).
4.
Wiley InterScience (Online service): A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).
5.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/.
6.
Copp, D. ed: The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. Oxford University Press, New York (2007).
7.
Copp, D. ed: The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. Oxford University Press, New York (2007).
8.
Thomson, J.J.: A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1, 47–66 (1971).
9.
Marquis, D.: Why Abortion is Immoral. The Journal of Philosophy. 86, 183–202 (1989). https://doi.org/10.2307/2026961.
10.
Cudd, A.E.: Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis’s ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’. The Journal of Philosophy. 87, 262–264 (1990). https://doi.org/10.2307/2026833.
11.
Tooley, M.: Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy & public affairs (Online)  Philosophy & public affairs [electronic resource]. Philos. public aff. (Online)  Philosophy and public affairs (Online) Philosophy and public affairs. 2, 37–65 (1972).
12.
Cohen, A.I., Wellman, C.H.: Contemporary debates in applied ethics. Blackwell Pub, Malden, MA (2005).
13.
Davis, N.: Abortion and Self-Defense. Philosophy & public affairs (Online)  Philosophy & public affairs [electronic resource]. Philos. public aff. (Online)  Philosophy and public affairs (Online) Philosophy and public affairs. 13, 175–207 (1984).
14.
Boonin-Vail, D.: A Defense of ‘A Defense of Abortion’: On the Responsibility Objection to Thomson’s Argument. Ethics. 107, 286–313 (1997).
15.
McDaniel, I.: The Responsibility Objection to Abortion: Rejecting the Notion that the Responsibility Objection Successfully Refutes a Woman’s Right to Choose. Bioethics. 29, 291–299 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12097.
16.
Gibson, R.F.: On an Inconsistency in Thomson’s Abortion Argument. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 46, 131–139 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353495.
17.
Finnis, J.: The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 2, 117–145 (1973).
18.
Brody, B.: Thomson on Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1, 335–340 (1972).
19.
Sparrow, R.: ‘A Not-So-New Eugenics’. Hastings Center report (Online)  The Hastings Center report [electronic resource]. Hastings cent. rep. (Online)  The Hastings Center report (Online). 41, 32–44 (2011).
20.
Public Affairs Quarterly.
21.
Kuhse, H., Singer, P.: Bioethics: an anthology. Blackwell Pub, Oxford (2006).
22.
Buchanan, A.E.: From chance to choice: genetics and justice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. (2000).
23.
Bostrom, N., Ord, T.: The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics. Ethics (Chicago, Ill. : Online)  Ethics [electronic resource]. Ethics (Online)  Ethics (Online). 116, 656–679 (2006).
24.
Savulescu, J., Bostrom, N.: Human enhancement. Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2011).
25.
Savulescu, J., Meulen, R.H.J. ter, Kahane, G.: Enhancing human capacities. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. (2011).
26.
Life Sciences, Society and Policy | Full text | Procreative Beneficence, Obligation, and Eugenics. https://doi.org/10.1186/1746-5354-3-3-43.
27.
Singer, P.: Animal liberation: towards an end to man’s inhumanity to animals. Paladin, London (1977).
28.
LaFollette, H.: Ethics in practice: an anthology. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, West Sussex (2014).
29.
Davis, S.L.: The Least Harm Principle May Require that Humans Consume a Diet Containing Large Herbivores, Not a Vegan Diet. Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics. 16, 387–394 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025638030686.
30.
McPherson, T.: A Case for Ethical Veganism Intuitive and Methodological Considerations. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 11, 677–703 (2014).
31.
Korsgaard, K.: A Kantian Case for Animal Rights.
32.
Singer, P.: Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 9, 325–337 (1980).
33.
Regan, T.: The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 5, 181–214 (1975).
34.
Fairlie, S.: Meat: a benign extravagance. Permanent Pub, East Meon (2010).
35.
Savoury, A.: How to green the world’s deserts and reverse climate change, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpTHi7O66pI.
36.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Howarth, R.B.: Perspectives on climate change: science, economics, politics, ethics. Elsevier JAI, Amsterdam (2005).
37.
KAGAN, S.: Do I Make a Difference? Philosophy & Public Affairs. 39, 105–141 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01203.x.
38.
NEFSKY, J.: Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to Kagan. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 39, 364–395 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2012.01209.x.
39.
Andreou, C.: Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 34, 95–108 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00054.x.
40.
Lawson, B.: Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (2013).
41.
Parfit, D.: Reasons and persons. Clarendon, Oxford (1984).
42.
Jamieson, Dale: When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists. Utilitas; Jun2007, Vol. 19, 160–183 (2007).
43.
Wündisch, J.: Green Votes not Green Virtues: Effective Utilitarian Responses to Climate Change. Utilitas. 26, 192–205 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820813000307.
44.
Spiekermann, K.: Small impacts and imperceptible effects: Causing harm with others.
45.
Glover, J., Scott-Taggart, M.J.: It Makes no Difference Whether or Not I Do It. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 49, 171–209 (1975).
46.
Broad, C.D.: On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics. International Journal of Ethics. 26, 377–397 (1916).
47.
Pinkert, F.: What if i cannot make a difference (and know it). Ethics. 125, 971–998 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1086/680909.
48.
Zwolinski, Matt: SWEATSHOPS, CHOICE, AND EXPLOITATION. Business Ethics Quarterly. 17, 689–727 (2007).
49.
Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1, 229–243 (1972).
50.
Pogge, T.: Real World Justice. The Journal of Ethics. 9, 29–53 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-004-3313-z.
51.
Green, K.: Distance, Divided Responsibility and Universalizability. The Monist. 86, 501–515 (2003). https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200386330.
52.
MacAskill, W.: Replaceability, Career Choice, and Making a Difference. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 17, 269–283 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9433-4.
53.
Collins, S.: Duties to Make Friends. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice. 16, 907–921 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9422-7.
54.
Deveaux, M.: The Global Poor as Agents of Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy. 12, 125–150 (2015).
55.
PABLO GILABERT: THE DUTY TO ERADICATE GLOBAL POVERTY: POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 7, 537–550 (2005).
56.
Brock, G.: Global Poverty and Desert. Politics. 26, 168–175 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2006.00265.x.
57.
Risse, M.: Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification? Ethics & International Affairs. 19, 9–18 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00485.x.
58.
Wenar, L.: Property Rights and the Resource Curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 36, 2–32 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00122.x.
59.
Miller, R.W.: Beneficence, Duty and Distance. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 32, 357–383 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00018.x.
60.
Satz, D.: What Do We Owe the Global Poor? Ethics & International Affairs. 19, 47–54 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00489.x.
61.
O’Neill, O.: Global Poverty and the Limits of Academic Expertise. Ethics & International Affairs. 26, 183–189 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679412000287.
62.
Spoerl, J.S.: Peter Singer on famine, affluence, and morality: a Christian response. American Journal of Jurisprudence. 37, 113–134 (1992).
63.
McElwee, B.: Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 14, 457–466 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9256-5.
64.
Pogge, T.: World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms. Polity, Cambridge (2008).
65.
Liam B. Murphy: The Demands of Beneficence. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 22, 267–292 (1993).
66.
Murphy, L.B.: Moral demands in nonideal theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2000).
67.
Pogge, T.: Priorities of global justice. Metaphilosophy. 32, 6–24 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00172.
68.
Unger, P.K.: Living high and letting die: our illusion of innocence. Oxford University Press, New York (1996).
69.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis: The Right to Privacy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7/1/1975, Vol. 4, (1975).
70.
Rachels, James: Why Privacy is Important. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7/1/1975, Vol. 4, (1975).
71.
Benn, S.I.: A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1988).
72.
Allen, A.L.: Unpopular privacy: what must we hide? Oxford University Press, New York (2011).
73.
Scanlon, Thomas: Thomson on Privacy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7/1/1975, Vol. 4, (1975).
74.
Benn, S.I.: A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1988).
75.
Hughes, R.L.D.: Two concepts of privacy. Computer Law & Security Review. 31, 527–537 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2015.05.010.
76.
Blaauw, M: THE EPISTEMIC ACCOUNT OF PRIVACY. EPISTEME-A JOURNAL OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY; JUN, 2013, 10 2, p167-p177,  11p. (2013).
77.
van den Hoven, M. J.: Privacy and the varieties of moral wrong-doing in an information age. Computers & Society; Sep1997, Vol. 27, 33–37 (1997).
78.
Mill, J.S., Gray, J.: On liberty, and other essays. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998).
79.
Parent, W.A.: Privacy, Morality, and the Law. Philosophy & public affairs (Online)  Philosophy & public affairs [electronic resource]. Philos. public aff. (Online)  Philosophy and public affairs (Online) Philosophy and public affairs. 12, 269–288 (1983).
80.
Gerstein, R.S.: Intimacy and Privacy. Ethics (Chicago, Ill. : Online)  Ethics [electronic resource]. Ethics (Online)  Ethics (Online). 89, 76–81 (1978).
81.
Etzioni, A.: The limits of privacy. Basic Books, New York, N.Y. (1999).
82.
van den Hoven van Genderen, Rob: Trading Privacy for Security [article]. Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 1, (2009).
83.
Lusk, Rachel E.: Facebook’s Newest Friend - Employers: Use of Social Networking in Hiring Challenges U.S. Privacy Constructs [comments]. Capital University Law Review, Vol. 42, (2014).
84.
Wiley InterScience (Online service): A companion to applied ethics. Blackwell, Oxford (2005).
85.
Lenman, J.: On Becoming Redundant or What Computers Shouldn’t Do. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 18, 1–11 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00169.
86.
Mitcham, C.: Convivial software: an end-user perspective on free and open source software. Ethics and Information Technology. 11, 299–310 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-009-9209-7.
87.
Bonnefon, J.-F., Shariff, A., Rahwan, I.: Autonomous Vehicles Need Experimental Ethics: Are We Ready for Utilitarian Cars? Science. 352, 1573–1576. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf2654.
88.
Nozick, R.: Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group, New York (2013).
89.
Parks, J.A.: Lifting the Burden of Women’s Care Work: Should Robots Replace the ‘Human Touch’? Hypatia. 25, 100–120 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01086.x.
90.
Collins, M.: Will Robots Replace Humans? Industrial Maintenance & Plant Operation. 75, 46–46 (2014).
91.
Wolbring, GYumakulov, S: Social Robots: Views of Staff of a Disability Service Organization. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ROBOTICS; AUG, 2014, 6 3, p457-p468,  12p. (2014).
92.
Information Technology Wants to Be Free. Academe, v98 n5 p18-23 Sep-Oct 2012. 18–23 (2012).
93.
Nihlén Fahlquist, J.: Saving lives in road traffic—ethical aspects. Journal of Public Health. 17, 385–394 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10389-009-0264-7.
94.
Hevelke, A., Nida-Rümelin, J.: Responsibility for Crashes of Autonomous Vehicles: An Ethical Analysis. Science and Engineering Ethics. 21, 619–630 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9565-5.
95.
Purves, D., Jenkins, R., Strawser, B.J.: Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting for the Right Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 18, 851–872 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9563-y.
96.
Ravid, O.: Don’t Sue Me, I Was Just Lawfully Texting & Drunk When My Autonomous Car Crashed into You. Southwestern Law Review. 44, 175–207 (2014).
97.
Waytz, A., Heafner, J., Epley, N.: The mind in the machine: Anthropomorphism increases trust in an autonomous vehicle. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 52, 113–117 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.01.005.
98.
Gurney, J.K.: Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles. Journal of Law, Technology & Policy. 247–277 (2013).
99.
Swift, A.: The morality of school choice. Theory and Research in Education. 2, 7–21 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504040574.
100.
Swift, A.: The morality of school choice reconsidered: a response. Theory & Research in Education. 2, 323–342 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504046528.
101.
Anderson, E.: Rethinking Equality of Opportunity: Comment on Adam Swift’s ‘How Not to Be a Hypocrite’. Theory and Research in Education,. 2, 99–110 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504043438.
102.
Macleod, C.M.: The Puzzle of Parental Partiality: Reflections on ‘How Not to Be a Hypocrite--School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent’. Theory and Research in Education. 2, 309–321 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504046526.
103.
Swift, A.: A short guide to hypocrisy. New Statesman. 132, 16–16 (2003).
104.
Clayton, M., Stevens, D.: School Choice and the Burdens of Justice. Theory and Research in Education. 2, 111–126 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504043439.
105.
Macleod, C.M.: The Puzzle of Parental Partiality: Reflections on How Not to Be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent. Theory and Research in Education. 2, 309–321 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504046526.
106.
Swift, A.: How not to be a hypocrite: school choice for the morally perplexed parent. Routledge, London (2003).
107.
Power, S.: Comments on ‘How Not to Be a Hypocrite’: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed. Theory and Research in Education. 2, 23–29 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504040575.
108.
Anderson, K.: How not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice and the Morally Perplexed Parent. Journal of Educational Thought. 40, 97–100 (2006).
109.
Leathwood, C.: A Critique of Institutional Inequalities in Higher Education (or an Alternative to Hypocrisy for Higher Educational Policy). Theory and Research in Education. 2, 31–48 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878504040576.
110.
Brighouse, H., Swift, A.: Legitimate Parental Partiality. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 37, 43–80 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.01145.x.
111.
Leibowitz, Uri D.: Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy; 2015, p1-23, 23p. 1–23 (2015).
112.
Singer, Peter: Moral Experts. Analysis, 3/1/1972, Vol. 32, (1972).
113.
Cross, B.: Moral Philosophy, Moral Expertise, and the Argument from Disagreement. Bioethics. 30, 188–194 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12173.
114.
Gesang, B: ARE MORAL PHILOSOPHERS MORAL EXPERTS? BIOETHICS; MAY, 2010, 24 4, p153-p159,  7p. (2010).
115.
Archard, D: WHY MORAL PHILOSOPHERS ARE NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE MORAL EXPERTS. BIOETHICS; MAR, 2011, 25 3, p119-p127,  9p. (2011).
116.
Hoffmann, M.: How to identify moral experts? An application of Goldman’s criteria for expert identification to the domain of morality. In: Analyse und Kritik. (2012).
117.
Burch, Robert W.: ARE THERE MORAL EXPERTS? The Monist, 10/1/1974, Vol. 58, (1974).
118.
Miller, Peter: Who are the Moral Experts? Journal of Moral Education; Oct1975, Vol. 5, 3–12 (1975).
119.
Nielsen, K.: On the need for ‘moral experts’: a test case for practical ethics. In: The International journal of applied philosophy. (1984).
120.
Hills, A.: Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology*. Ethics. 120, 94–127 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1086/648610.
121.
Driver, Julia: Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 4/1/2006, Vol. 128, (2006).
122.
Goldman, Alvin I.: Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7/1/2001, Vol. 63, (2001).