

PH251: Metaphysics

[View Online](#)

1

Tallant, Jonathan. Metaphysics: an introduction. London: : Continuum 2011.

2

Kim, Jaegwon, Sosa, Ernest, Korman, Daniel Z. Metaphysics: an anthology. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: : Wiley-Blackwell 2012.

3

Perry J. The two faces of identity. In: Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self. Hackett Publishing Company

4

John Perry. The Same F. The Philosophical Review 1970;**79**
:181–200.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2183947>

5

Perry J. The Same F. Philosophical review 1970;**79**:181–200.

6

E. J. Lowe. What is a Criterion of Identity? The Philosophical Quarterly 1989;**39**
:1–21.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2220347>

7

Lowe EJ. What is a Criterion of Identity? The philosophical quarterly 1989;**39**:1–21.

8

Lowe EJ. Objects and criteria of identity. In: A companion to the philosophy of language. Oxford: : Blackwell 1997.

9

Michael R. Ayers. Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds. The Journal of Philosophy 1981;**78**:247–72.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2025955>

10

Ayers M. Locke versus Aristotle on natural kinds. Journal of philosophy 1981;**78**:247–72.

11

Ayers, Michael. Locke. London: : Routledge 1991.

12

M. R. Ayers. The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke's Philosophy. The Philosophical Quarterly 1975;**25**:1–27.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2217949>

13

Ayers MR. The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke's Philosophy. The philosophical quarterly 1975;**25**:1–27.

14

Stroud, Barry. Hume. London (etc.): : Routledge and Kegan Paul 1977.

15

Stroud, Barry. Hume. London (etc.): : Routledge and Kegan Paul 1977.

16

Pears, David. Hume's system: an examination of the first book of his Treatise. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1990.

17

Wiggins D. Substance. In: Philosophy: a guide through the subject. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1995.

18

Michael Ayers. Substance: Prolegomena to a Realist Theory of Identity. The Journal of Philosophy 1991;**88**
:69-90.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2026907>

19

Ayers M. Substance: Prolegomena to a realist theory of identity. Journal of philosophy 1991;**88**:69-90.

20

Shoemaker S. Identity, Properties, and Causality. In: Identity, cause, and mind: philosophical essays. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1979.

21

Putnam H. The meaning of 'meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1975;**7**:131-93.

22

Kripke, Saul A. Naming and necessity. Revised and enlarged ed. Oxford: : Blackwell 1980.

23

Wiggins, David. Sameness and substance renewed. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2001.

24

Wiggins D. Identity, Individuation and Substance. European Journal of Philosophy 2012;**20**:1–25. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00516.x

25

Ayers M. Individuals without Sortals. Canadian journal of philosophy 1974;**4**:113–48.

26

LOWE EJ. Sortals and the Individuation of Objects. Mind & Language 2007;**22**:514–33. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00318.x

27

WIGGINS D. Sortal Concepts: A Reply To Xu. Mind & Language 2007;**12**:413–21. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00081.x

28

Wiggins D. Sortal concepts: A reply to Xu. Mind & language 1997;**12**:413–21.

29

Casati R. Is the Object Concept Formal? Dialectica 2005;**58**:383–94. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00312.x

30

Casati R. Is the Object Concept Formal? *Dialectica* 2004;**58**:383–94.

31

Sarnecki JE. Sortals for Dummies. *Erkenntnis* 2008;**69**:145–64.
doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9094-6

32

Goodman R. Why and how not to be a sortalist about thought. *Philosophical Perspectives* 2012;**26**:77–112. doi:10.1111/phpe.12002

33

Wiggins, David. *Sameness and substance renewed*. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2001.

34

Lewis, David K. *On the plurality of worlds*. Oxford: : Basil Blackwell 1986.

35

Haslanger S. Persistence through time. In: *The Oxford handbook of metaphysics*. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2005.
<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.001.0001>

36

Haslanger S. Persistence through time. In: *The Oxford handbook of metaphysics*. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2003.

37

Hawley, Katherine. *How things persist*. Oxford: : Clarendon 2004.

<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275434.001.0001>

38

Mark Johnston and Graeme Forbes. Is There a Problem about Persistence? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 1987;**61**:107–55.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/4106835>

39

Johnston M. Is There a Problem About Persistence? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary volume 1987;**61**:107–35.

40

Hofweber T, Velleman JD. How to Endure. The Philosophical Quarterly 2011;**61**:37–57. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.671.x

41

Theodore Sider. Four-Dimensionalism. The Philosophical Review 1997;**106**:197–231.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2998357>

42

Sider T. Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical review 1997;**106**:197–231.

43

Sider, Theodore. Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. Oxford: : Clarendon 2001.
<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001>

44

Lewis D. Many, but almost one. In: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Volume 2. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1993.

<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1017/CBO9780511625343>

45

Hawley, Katherine. *How things persist*. Oxford: : Clarendon 2004.

<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275434.001.0001>

46

Katherine Hawley. *Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2005;**71**

:602–21.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/40040887>

47

Hawley K. *Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts*. *Philosophy and phenomenological research* 2005;**71**:602–21.

48

Hawley K. *Persistence and Determination*. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 2008;**62**:197–212. doi:10.1017/S1358246108000647

49

Ayers, Michael. *Locke*. London: : Routledge 1991.

50

Williams, Bernard. *Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972*. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 1973.

<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1017/CBO9780511621253>

51

Williams, Bernard. *Problems of the self: philosophical papers, 1956–1972*. London: : Cambridge University Press 1973.

52

Derek Parfit. Personal Identity. The Philosophical Review 1971;**80**
:3–27.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2184309>

53

Parfit D. Personal identity. Philosophical review 1971;**80**:3–27.

54

Lewis D. Survival and identity. In: The identities of persons. Berkeley (etc.): : University of California Press 1976.

55

Lewis D. Survival and identity. In: Philosophical papers: Vol. 1. New York: : Oxford University Press 1983.
<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/0195032047.001.0001>

56

McDowell JH. Reductionism and the First Person. In: Mind, value, and reality. Cambridge, Mass: : Harvard University Press 1998.

57

Cassam Q. Reductionism - Chapter 5. In: Self and world. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 1997. <http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/0198238959.001.0001>

58

Cassam Q. Reductionism - Chapter 5. In: Self and world. Oxford: : Clarendon 1997.

59

Quassim Cassam. Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1993;**93**:17–37.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/4545163>

60

Cassam Q. Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for Systematic Study of Philosophy 1993;**93**:17–37.

61

Olson, Eric T. The human animal: personal identity without psychology. New York: : Oxford University Press 1997.
<http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1093/0195134230.001.0001>

62

Olson, Eric T. The human animal: personal identity without psychology. New York: : Oxford University Press 1997.

63

Eric T. Olson. Was I Ever a Fetus? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1997;**57**:95–110.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2953779>

64

Olson ET. Was I Ever a Fetus? Philosophy and phenomenological research 1997;**57**:95–110.

65

Snowdon P. Persons and Personal Identity. In: Essays for David Wiggins: identity, truth, and value. Oxford: : Blackwell 1996.

66

Snowdon P. Persons, Animals and Bodies. In: The body and the self. Cambridge, Mass: : MIT Press 1998.

<http://0-cognet.mit.edu.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/library/books/view?isbn=0262522489>

67

Snowdon P. Persons, Animals and Bodies. In: The Body and the self. Cambridge, Mass: : MIT Press 1995.

68

Mark Johnston. Human Beings. The Journal of Philosophy 1987;**84**:59–83.<http://0-www.jstor.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/stable/2026626>

69

Johnston M. Human Beings. Journal of philosophy 1987;**84**:59–83.

70

Chalmers D. Ontological Anti-Realism. In: Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford: : Clarendon Press 2009.