

# PH211: Ethics

[View Online](#)

---

[1]

Alexander Miller 2013. Contemporary metaethics: an introduction. Polity.

[2]

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy. 33, 124 (1958), 1–19.  
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100037943>.

[3]

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy: the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. 33, 124 (1958), 1–19.  
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100037943>.

[4]

Baier, A. Progress of sentiments reflections on Hume's Treatise.

[5]

Blackburn, S. 2000. Ruling passions: a theory of practical reasoning. Clarendon Press.

[6]

Brady, M.S. 2010. New waves in metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.

[7]

Brady, M.S. 2010. New waves in metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.

[8]

Brink, D.O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.

[9]

Brink, D.O. 1989. Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge University Press.

[10]

Brink, D.O. 1984. Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 62, 2 (1984), 111–125.  
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408412341311>.

[11]

Campbell Brown 2011. Consequentialize This! Ethics. 121, 4 (2011), 749–771.

[12]

Cohon, R. 2004. Hume's Moral Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2004).

[13]

Copp, D. 2007. The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. Oxford University Press.

[14]

Copp, D. 2006. The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. Oxford University Press.

[15]

Crisp, R. and Slote, M. 1997. *Virtue ethics*. Oxford University Press.

[16]

Darwall, S.L. 1998. *Philosophical ethics*. Westview.

[17]

Darwall, S.L. 1998. *Philosophical ethics*. Westview.

[18]

Darwall, S.L. 1998. *Philosophical ethics*. Westview.

[19]

Darwall, S.L. 1998. *Philosophical ethics*. Westview.

[20]

Dreier, J. 1993. Structures of Normative Theories. *The Monist*. 76, 1 (1993), 22–40.

[21]

Enoch, D. 2006. Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action. *The Philosophical Review*. 115, 2 (2006), 169–198.

[22]

Fisher, A. and Kirchin, S. 2006. *Arguing about metaethics*. Routledge.

[23]

Gibbard, A. 1990. *Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment*. Clarendon.

[24]

Guyer, P. 2006. The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

[25]

Guyer, P. 2006. The Cambridge companion to Kant and modern philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

[26]

Herman, B. 1996. The practice of moral judgment. Harvard University Press.

[27]

Hume, D. et al. 2014. A treatise of human nature. Oxford University Press.

[28]

Hume, D. et al. 2000. A treatise of human nature. Oxford University Press.

[29]

Kant, I. and Gregor, M.J. 1998. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge University Press.

[30]

Kant, I. and Gregor, M.J. 1998. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge University Press.

[31]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge University Press.

[32]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *Creating the kingdom of ends*. Cambridge University Press.

[33]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge University Press.

[34]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *Creating the kingdom of ends*. Cambridge University Press.

[35]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge University Press.

[36]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *Creating the kingdom of ends*. Cambridge University Press.

[37]

Korsgaard, C.M. 2009. *Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity*. Oxford University Press.

[38]

Korsgaard, C.M. 2009. *Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity*. Oxford University Press.

[39]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *The Sources of Normativity*. Cambridge University Press.

[40]

Korsgaard, C.M. 1996. *The sources of normativity*. Cambridge University Press.

[41]

Mackie, J.L. 1977. *Ethics: inventing right and wrong*. Penguin.

[42]

Mackie, J.L. 1980. *Hume's moral theory*. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

[43]

McDowell, J. 1979. *Virtue and Reason*. *The Monist*. 62, 3 (1979), 331–350.  
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197962319>.

[44]

Peter Railton 1984. *Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality*. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 13, 2 (1984), 134–171.

[45]

Pettit, P. 1997. *The Consequentialist Perspective*. *Three methods of ethics: a debate*. Blackwell. 92–174.

[46]

Portmore, D.W. 2009. *Consequentializing*. *Philosophy Compass*. 4, 2 (2009), 329–347.  
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00198.x>.

[47]

Railton, P. 1984. *Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality*. *Philosophy and public affairs*. 13, 2 (1984), 134–171.

[48]

Railton, P. 1986. Moral Realism. *The Philosophical Review*. 95, 2 (1986), 163–207.

[49]

Rawls, J. and Freeman, S.R. 1999. *Collected papers*. Harvard University Press.

[50]

Rawls, J. and Herman, B. 2000. *Lectures on the history of moral philosophy*. Harvard University Press.

[51]

Rawls, J. and Herman, B. 2000. *Lectures on the history of moral philosophy*. Harvard University Press.

[52]

Rowe, C.J. et al. 2002. *Nicomachean ethics*. Oxford University Press.

[53]

Rowland, R. 2012. Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons. *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*. 7, 1 (2012), 1–24.

[54]

Russell, D.C. ed. 2013. *The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

[55]

Scanlon, T. 2014. *Being realistic about reasons*. Oxford University Press.

[56]

Scheffler, S. 1994. The rejection of consequentialism: a philosophical investigation of the considerations underlying rival moral conceptions. Clarendon.

[57]

Scheffler, S. 1994. The rejection of consequentialism: a philosophical investigation of the considerations underlying rival moral conceptions. Clarendon.

[58]

Shafer, L. Ethical theory : an anthology.

[59]

Shafer-Landau, R. Foundations of ethics.

[60]

Shafer-Landau, R. Foundations of ethics.

[61]

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral realism: a defence. Clarendon.

[62]

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral realism: a defence. Clarendon Press.

[63]

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral realism: a defence. Clarendon.



[64]

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. *Moral realism: a defence*. Clarendon Press.

[65]

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. *Moral realism: a defence*. Clarendon.

[66]

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. *Moral realism: a defence*. Clarendon Press.

[67]

Sigrun Svavarsdottir 1999. Moral Cognitivism and Motivation. *The Philosophical Review*. 108, 2 (1999), 161–219.

[68]

Singer, P. 1993. *A companion to ethics*. Blackwell Reference.

[69]

Singer, P. 1991. *A companion to ethics*. Basil Blackwell.

[70]

Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, B. 1973. *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Cambridge University Press.

[71]

Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, B. 1973. *Utilitarianism, for and against*. Cambridge University Press.

[72]

Smith, M.A. 1994. The moral problem. Blackwell.

[73]

Smith, M.A. 1994. The moral problem. Blackwell.

[74]

Smith, M.A. 1994. The moral problem. Blackwell.

[75]

Street, S. 2010. What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? *Philosophy Compass*. 5, 5 (2010), 363–384. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x>.

[76]

Susan Wolf 1982. Moral Saints. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 79, 8 (1982), 419–439.

[77]

Svavarsdottir, S. 1999. Moral Cognitivism and Motivation. *Philosophical review*. 108, 2 (1999), 161–219.

[78]

Williams, B. 1981. *Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973-1980*. Cambridge University Press.

[79]

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.